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THE ROLE OF APPELLATE JUDGES IN
INTERMEDIATE COURTS
One consequence of the significant discretion accorded trial
courts in the performance of the fact-finding function is that
appellate judges quite often defer to decisions that they would not
have themselves made.1 This is a natural and logical consequence
of a system in which the roles of different courts in the judicial
hierarchy are fairly clearly spelled out and judges are content to
work within the framework established.
Justice Gene Franchini's brief personal essay serves to
contrast the perspectives afforded trial and appellate judges by that
framework. The trial judge, who undoubtedly has the greatest
opportunity to exercise discretion within that framework, may still
feel compelled by personal conviction to resign from the bench
because discretion has been eliminated by the legislature. No
doubt many trial judges have come to resent the encroachment on
their ability to exercise sentencing judgment by enactment of
mandatory sentencing statutes or creation of sentencing guidelines
in which decisions are preempted by grid.2 But a supreme court
1. Indeed, one court describes the process of reviewing for abuse of discretion as
determining whether a trial court's decision "was so clearly wrong as to lie outside that zone
within which reasonable persons might disagree." Cantu v. State, 842 S.W.2d 667, 682 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1992).
2. See, e.g., KATE STrrH & JOSE A. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING: SENTENCiNG
GUIDEUNES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS (1998).
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justice, serving on a court of last resort, may experience the same
sense of constraint, as Justice Franchini notes in his recent
concurrence to an affirmance in a capital case, where he expresses
his personal belief that capital punishment reflects bad public
policy.3 To the extent that sentencing policy is a matter of
legislative prerogative, judges at all levels within that framework
may experience frustration when addressing the circumstances of
an individual case.'
Given the considerable discretion afforded trial judges and
other primary decisionmakers, such as legislatures5  and
administrative agencies-noted by Professor Martha Davis in this
issue-and the potential for limiting review accorded to courts of
last resort, the role of intermediate courts is, in a sense,
professionally compromised. While the workload of those courts
3. State v. Clark, 1999 N.M. 035, 990 P.2d 793. Justice Franchini reiterated his personal
opposition to the death penalty in a separate opinion in State v. Allen, 2000 N.M. 002, 121. A
similar concurrence was authored by Senior Judge Gerald W. Heaney of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in Singleton v. Norris, 108 F.3d 872, 876 (8th Cir.
1997), with his conclusion: "[A]lthough I am compelled to adhere to the law, I nonetheless
announce my personal view that this nation's administration of capital punishment is simply
irrational, arbitrary, and unfair. The problems are inherent in the enterprise itself."
4. For example, in affirming a mandatory sentence for an Arkansas felon convicted of
possession of a firearm, the Eighth Circuit panel observed, in light of the facts developed at
trial:
We are not unmindful of the apparent absurdity in sentencing an individual to
fifteen years imprisonment for the equivalent of duck hunting. We are equally
aware, however, that Congress has tied our hands and removed a much-needed
measure of judicial discretion through its enactment of the fifteen year
mandatory minimum provision of § 924(e)(1) of the Armed Career Criminal
Act. For the aforementioned reasons, we affirm Bates's conviction and sentence.
United States v. Bates, 77 F.3d 1101, 1106 (8th Cir. 1996) (emphasis added).
5. Legislators may conclude that courts have failed to give adequate deference to their
action and move to restrict judicial activism. For example, in "reforming" Arkansas
workers' compensation law, the General Assembly criticized such activism:
The Seventy-Ninth General Assembly realizes that the Arkansas workers'
compensation statutes must be revised from time to time. Unfortunately, many
of the changes made by this act were necessary because administrative law
judges, the Workers' Compensation Commission, and the Arkansas courts have
continually broadened the scope and eroded the purpose of the workers'
compensation statutes of this state.... When, and if, the workers' compensation
statutes of this state need to be changed, the General Assembly acknowledges its
responsibility to do so. It is the specific intent of the Seventy-Ninth General
Assembly to repeal, annul, and hold for naught all prior opinions or decisions of
any administrative law judge, the Workers' Compensation Commission, or
courts of this state contrary to or in conflict with any provision of this act.
1993 Ark. Acts 796, § 35 (codified at ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-9-101 (1998)).
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increases, the opportunities for intellectual creativity are
seemingly contracting. An example of this tendency is the
restriction imposed on federal habeas courts by the Supreme
Court's decision in Teague v. Lane,6 followed by the 1996
amendments to the federal habeas statute in the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act
Teague limited the discretion afforded federal habeas and
circuit courts to announce new principles of federal constitutional
law in disposing of meritorious claims raised by habeas
petitioners. There are significant values expressed in the Court's
rationale that restrict federal courts from articulating "new" rules
of federal constitutional criminal procedure in the process of
collateral review, including the Court's respect for comity, finality,
and federalism as critical to the maintenance of a federalized
judicial system. In the process, of course, as a cost of balancing the
interests of state and federal judicial systems, some habeas
petitioners simply do not benefit from arguments that might have
warranted relief on direct appeal.
But Teague also served to limit the creativity of federal
district and circuit judges as legal thinkers. Faced with novel
claims that might have otherwise warranted relief, or at least
serious discussion in the forum of direct appeal, judges bound by
Teague have essentially been barred from exercising their
intellectual skills in expanding legal doctrine. While they are still
permitted to consider whether a rule is "new" or is dictated by
precedent, Teague precludes judges from relying on analytical
processes traditionally used to resolve novel questions of law
when confronted with novel constitutional issues.
For example, reasoning by analogy is commonplace in the
legal system. We struggle to teach law students to rely on analogy
in resolving hypothetical questions in the classroom. The Eighth
Circuit used precisely this approach in Bohlen v. Caspar8 to
conclude that double jeopardy protections afforded by the federal
constitution would apply to non-capital sentencing proceedings.
The circuit court relied on the holding in Bullington v. Missour9
6. 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
7. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244, 2253-2255, 2261-
2266 (1998).
8. 979 F.2d 109 (8th Cir. 1992), rev'd, 510 U.S. 383 (1994).
9. 451 U.S. 430 (1981).
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that the double jeopardy bar prevented imposition of a death
sentence after a prior jury had imposed life in a capital sentencing
proceeding resembling a trial in significant respects,'0 and
reasoned by analogy that the same protection should be afforded
in non-capital proceedings." The Supreme Court reversed on the
basis of Teague.2 This application of the Teague bar served to
forewarn lower federal courts that the extension of doctrine, even
through the logical process of analogous application of existing
rules, would violate the "new" rule doctrine.1" The simple
reasoning skill stressed in legal education was denied to judges
struggling with the resolution of an arguably meritorious, if
relatively obscure, constitutional claim.1
4
Similarly, the standard of review of claims of federal
constitutional violations in habeas actions brought by state
inmates, once set by the federal courts,'5 has now been limited by
Congress in the amendment of the federal habeas statute. A federal
habeas court cannot afford relief unless the state court's
disposition of the federal claims is contrary to or reflects an
unreasonable application of United States Supreme Court
10. The circuit court first identified a core fact essential to whether the Bullington principle
would extend to non-capital cases: "The persistent offender sentencing enhancement procedure
in Missouri has protections similar to those in the capital sentencing hearing in Bullington."
Bohlen, 979 F.2d at 112.
11. The court then applied the rationale underlying the holding in Bullington, to hold
that double jeopardy protections are applicable in non-capital sentencing proceedings:
"According to its plain language, Bullington is applicable to any sentencing procedure that
is sufficiently similar to a trial of guilt or innocence to implicate the double jeopardy
clause." Id. at 113.
12. Caspari v. Bohlen, 510 U.S. 383 (1994).
13. The circuit court had considered the impact of Teague and concluded that application
of Bullington to all sentencing proceedings, including non-capital proceedings, would not
constitute imposition of a "new rule" in the habeas process. Instead, the court concluded that
Bullington itself had simply applied the preexisting rule regarding evidentiary insufficiency
announced in Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1 (1978) (citing Bullington, 451 U.S. at 442-43).
Bohlen, 979 F.2d at 111-12.
14. The Supreme Court ultimately rejected the Eighth Circuit's reasoning in Bohlen,
holding in Monge v. California, 524 U.S. 721, 724 (1998) that double jeopardy protections are
implicated in non-capital sentencing proceedings in which the issue was raised on direct appeal.
15. In a series of decisions in the early 1990s, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the principle
of de novo review of federal constitutional claims by federal habeas courts, Wright v. West,
505 U.S. 277 (1992), and imposed a burden on federal habeas petitioners to demonstrate first,
that constitutional trial error "had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining
the jury's verdict," Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 622 (1993), and second, that "grave
doubt" involving the prejudicial effect of constitutional trial error should be resolved in favor
of the federal habeas petitioner, O'Neal v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 432, 435 (1995).
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precedent.16
Regardless of the merits of congressional retooling of the
federal habeas remedy, the clear goal of restricting the use of
federal habeas as a vehicle for constitutional interpretation can
hardly be missed. 7 This may eventually prove to be a foreseeable
consequence of the national struggle over re-implementation of
the death penalty following Furman v. Georgia,' or an expected
casualty in the War Against Drugs. Neither is the focus of these
observations. Rather, the latest trends in deference required of
intermediate appellate judges suggest a diminished intellectual
expectation of those jurists. Compelled by traditional or
legislatively imposed standards of deferential review, intermediate
appellate judges may be relegated to the mundane task of
affirmin , virtually disregarding serious claims for justice in the
process.
If the intellectual demands made of intermediate judges
continue to be watered down, the question that likely follows is
who will aspire to these very important benches. Unlike trial
judges, who at least have the option of enjoying the work involved
in unobtrusively supervising a well-tried case, appellate judges
16. Title 28 of the United States Code § 2254(d)(1) now limits federal habeas relief to
cases in which the state court's rejection of a federal constitutional claim asserted by a state
inmate "resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of
clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States." The
question of how much deference to state court decisionmaking is now required of federal
habeas courts has now been addressed by the Supreme Court in Williams v. Taylor, 120 S. Ct.
1495, 1516 (2000) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
17. See Alan K. Chen, Shadow Law: Reasonable Unreasonableness, Habeas Theory, and
the Nature of Legal Rules, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 535 (1999). Professor Chen observes that the
changes in federal habeas corpus implicit in Congressional action has been clear:
Section 2254(d)(1) transforms the nature and scope of federal habeas review by
prohibiting federal habeas courts from reviewing erroneous, but reasonable, state
court decisions on federal questions. For better or worse, this is now the law of
federal habeas review. There is not much to be gained from attempting to piece
the remains of Brown v. Allen, like Humpty Dumpty, back together again, at
least not in the academic world.
Id. at 633-34.
18. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
19. My colleague, Professor Morell E. (Gene) Mullins, refers to this as "cookie-cutter
jurisprudence" in our conversations. Professor Chen concludes that the revision of federal
habeas law has fundamentally altered the "structure of constitutional criminal procedure,"
resulting in "the reasonable unreasonableness standard's distorting effect on the deterrent
function of constitutional standards and its subversive impact on the exposition of criminal
procedure law." Chen, supra note 17, at 634.
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necessarily must face a less-active social setting for their work.
With a decline in the significance and, perhaps, quality of oral
argument, the number of occasions for professional interaction
will diminish as caseloads increase and the use of digital research
tools limits trips to the library. Will the intermediate bench attract
intellectually acute and scholarly perceptive lawyers if the
opportunity for interpretation is so restricted that issuance of pro
forma opinions becomes more commonplace? Will the best legal
minds seek out this opportunity for service, and will it offer a
training ground for the best judicial minds to continue their work
on courts of last resort?
Certainly, the most able attorneys will always be able to earn
more money in practice than in judicial service. Sacrifice of
financial rewards often results from an appointment to the bench.
Service on the trial bench offers the skilled practitioner the
opportunity to exercise personal judgment in the scores of
discretionary decisions that must be made in an individual case.
Service on a court of last resort offers a different opportunity
afforded a truly privileged minority to participate in shaping the
developing law. Service on the many intermediate courts in this
nation is particularly important because of their role in maintaining
both an orderly development of the law in directions set by the
legislature and higher courts and in ensuring that trials are events
thoughtfully and fairly administered. Imposition of too many
restrictions on the intellectual abilities of intermediate appellate
judges, like reduced demands for creative thinking, may lead to
atrophy. Undoubtedly, these benches will always be attractive to
many lawyers. The key is to ensure that bright, able, intellectually
active lawyers continue to view these courts as offering new
challenges for service.
THE SUCCESS OF APPELLATE MEDIATION
Richard Becker's discussion of the implementation of the
appellate mediation program in New Mexico (Vol. I/No. 2)
suggests the question of how successful mediation can be at the
appellate level. The initial annual report on the program shows
that 45 cases settled during the first twelve months of its operation,
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representing a settlement rate in eligible cases of 23%, up from
6%, or 12 eligible cases annually, during the preceding three
years. The New Mexico Court of Appeals has extended the
program indefinitely.
PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT IN CLOSING
ARGUMENT
Many readers have written with regard to the schedule for
publication of Paul Spiegelman's second part to his study of
prosecutorial misconduct published in our first issue. Professor
Spiegelman has been delayed by serious family medical problems,




20. 38 N.M. B. BULL., Sept. 23, 1999, at 1.

